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I. Introduction 
A widely accepted model of American legal history is that 
“classical” legal thought, which dominated much of the 
nineteenth century, was displaced by “progressive” legal thought, 
which survived through the New Deal and in some form to this 
day. Within its domain, this was a revolution nearly on par with 
Copernicus or Newton. This paradigm has been adopted by both 
progressive liberals who defend this revolution1 and by classical 
                                                                                                     
 * Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law & History, University of 
Iowa. 
 1. See generally BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 
(1991); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 1870–1960 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9–63 (1992); DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND 
FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, RETHINKING 
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liberals who lament it.2 Nevertheless, the model seriously 
misinterprets the legal revolution that occurred in the early 
twentieth century. 
We identify classical legal thought with efforts to systematize 
legal rules along lines that had become familiar in the natural 
sciences in the early nineteenth century.3 This methodology 
sought not only simplification and classification, but also 
“formalism,” in the sense that it presented the law as a complete 
system.4 At the risk of some caricature, the “data” of this system 
were legal decisions—a model that reflected not only the 
penchant for classification but also commitment to law as 
essentially judge-made and evolving over long historical 
development. Historicism became an important attribute of legal 
classicism.5 The authors who are held up as exemplars of classical 
legal thought include such people as Gilded Age Harvard Law 
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell6 and Francis Wharton, an 
Episcopal priest and prolific legal writer who produced 
                                                                                                     
THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY STATE 
(1992); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: 
LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, Form and 
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Duncan 
Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The 
Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, 3 RES. L. & SOC. 3 
(1980). See also Suzanna Sherry, Property Is the New Privacy: The Coming 
Constitutional Revolution, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1452 (2015) (reviewing RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR 
LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014)). 
 2. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014); DAVID 
N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
(2011); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION: THE 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014).  
 3. See generally GEORGE H. DANIELS, AMERICAN SCIENCE IN THE AGE OF 
JACKSON 102–18 (1968); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN 
AMERICA, 1800–1860 (1978). 
 4. See DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT AND 
THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 2 (2013) (discussing historiciam in Gilded 
Age American legal thought).   
 5. See generally id.  
 6. See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: 
NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 114–16 (2015) [hereinafter 
HOVENKAMP, OPENING]; CHRISTOPHER C. LANGDELL, SELECTION OF CASES ON THE 
LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871). 
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commentaries on many legal subjects.7 While classical legal 
thought was generally anti-statist on economic matters, it was 
not libertarian. In fact, it advocated heavy state regulation of 
morals even as it supported liberty of contract without state 
interference as a general matter.8 The anti-legislative bias of 
legal classicism readily accommodated doctrines such as economic 
substantive due process, which originated in the state courts and 
was prominent in Supreme Court doctrine for the first four 
decades of the twentieth century.9 
The classical-to-progressive model of historical explanation is 
far too narrow to account for the transformative, broadly 
supported changes in American law that occurred during the 
decades straddling 1900. A wide spectrum of jurists and legal 
thinkers, both liberal and conservative, embraced these changes. 
Classical legal thought would have collapsed even if progressives 
had never showed up. 
This vision of a classical–progressive dichotomy persists, 
however, because it serves the interests of both the defenders and 
opponents of the institutions we associate with progressive legal 
thought—namely, state involvement in wealth distribution, 
increasing public involvement in economic development, the rise 
of regulatory agencies with broad quasi-judicial and quasi-
legislative powers, deferential judicial review of economic 
legislation, and aggressive judicial review of government actions 
injuring discrete and insular minorities. 
American law experienced important changes during the 
period from the Gilded Age through the New Deal. In piecemeal 
                                                                                                     
 7. See Stephen A. Siegel, Francis Wharton’s Orthodoxy: God, Historical 
Jurisprudence, and Classical Legal Thought, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 422, 422 
(2004) (describing Wharton’s legal scholarship). See generally FRANCIS 
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1846); 
FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIVIL ISSUES 
(1877); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE (1874); 
FRANCIS WHARTON, A COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1882); FRANCIS 
WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: OR, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1st ed. 1872). 
 8. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243–62 (discussing state 
regulation of morals as part of substantive due process). 
 9. See id. at 243–77 (discussing the development of substantive due 
process as part of legal classicism). 
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fashion, private law gradually shifted away from common law 
dominance and towards an age of statutes, which makes dating 
this change next to impossible. By contrast, the date for the 
revolution in public law is often conveniently stated as 1937, 
when the Supreme Court switched positions on both state10 and 
federal11 economic regulation. A year later, the Supreme Court 
announced that federal economic legislation would from that time 
be treated deferentially, although legislation that injured 
powerless minorities would be treated more harshly.12 These 
views were cemented into constitutional law when President 
Roosevelt succeeded in filling nearly every seat on the Supreme 
Court with New Deal supporters.13 
Setting 1937–1938 as the birth date for progressive public 
law is problematic, however. Important events occurred much 
earlier. Throughout the nineteenth century, state and local 
governments were actively involved in the regulation of health, 
safety, and morals.14 In the late nineteenth century this 
regulation reached more expansively to purely economic labor 
protection and licensing.15 
In 1905, Justice Holmes complained in his Lochner v. New 
York16 dissent that the revolution had already occurred: the 
                                                                                                     
 10. See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (“The 
community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable 
employers.”).  
 11. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) 
(noting that Congress had the power to pass the National Labor Relations Act 
and upholding a decision of the NLRB).  
 12.  United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 13. Hugo Black (August 1937), Stanley Reed (January 1938), Felix 
Frankfurter (January 1939), William O. Douglas (April 1939), Frank Murphy 
(January 1940), James F. Byrnes (June 1941, succeeded fifteen months later by 
Wiley B. Rutledge), Robert H. Jackson (July 1941), and Chief Justice Harlan 
Fisk Stone (July 1941). 
 14. See generally HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243–62; WILLIAM J. 
JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST ONE 
HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012); NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE: LAW & REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
 15. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243–77 (discussing the 
development of substantive due process and labor policy in the nineteenth 
century); MASHAW, supra note 14, at 227–51 (discussing the development of the 
administrative state during the Gilded Age). 
 16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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majority’s decision striking down a ten-hour law for bakers “is 
decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the 
country does not entertain.”17 Further, Holmes acknowledged, he 
himself was uncertain about the theory. “I should desire to study 
it further and long before making up my mind.”18 However, 
accepting or rejecting the legitimacy of the underlying economic 
theory was not part of his role as a judge.19 Over the next thirty 
years, the Supreme Court struck down several state statutes and 
some federal ones, implicitly rejecting this emergent economic 
theory, but many of the statutes were overturned by very narrow 
majorities, particularly those involving state law.20 
The record on federal legislation also shows a much earlier 
evolution. First, the history of federal railroad regulation and the 
Interstate Commerce Commission stretches back to the 1880s,21 
and of antitrust enforcement to the 1890s.22 In 1918, the Supreme 
Court struck down the first federal child labor statute under the 
Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment, applying the well-
developed distinction between “commerce” and 
“manufacturing.”23 The decision was 5–4, however, which was a 
different judicial split than the 8–1 decision that had applied that 
same rationale in an antitrust case twenty-three years earlier.24 
                                                                                                     
 17. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. (“But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly 
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a 
majority to embody their opinions in law.”). 
 20. See generally id.; Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) 
(striking down a minimum wage statute for women); Morehead v. New York ex 
rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (striking down a minimum wage provision).  
 21. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: 
Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1017–20 (1988) 
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict] (describing the development of 
railroad regulation during the Gilded Age); MASHAW, supra note 14, at 3–5, 189 
(discussing the role of the Interstate Commerce Commission in developing the 
modern administrative state). 
 22. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, 
at 241–340 (1991) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE] (discussing the origins 
of the antitrust movement).  
 23. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 24. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce 
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.”). 
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Seven years before that, the Court was unanimous in applying 
that rationale to upset a federal statute that regulated both 
locally produced liquor and that shipped across state lines.25 
Other doctrines used to strike down federal legislation, such as 
limitations on congressional power to delegate authority to 
agencies, enjoyed more widespread support—such as the 8–1 
decision in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan26 and the unanimous 
decision in Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States.27 
Legal and constitutional history writing about the rise of 
progressive legal thought has tended to focus on the changing 
political environment, rather than nonlegal causes whose 
influence was much broader. Those historians who looked to 
nonlegal sources generally saw the most important as Darwinian 
evolutionary theory and the social science ideas that grew out of 
it—particularly reform Darwinist sociology, instrumentalism, 
Freudianism, and genetic determinism.28 
But Darwinian ideas hardly serve to divide progressive from 
classical legal thought. Indeed, the conservatives who reacted 
against progressive economic legislation in the early twentieth 
century were often characterized as Social Darwinists—even by 
Justice Holmes. He quipped in his Lochner dissent that the 
Fourteenth Amendment did “not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s 
Social Statics.”29 Beginning with Edward S. Corwin and Richard 
Hofstadter in the 1940s, historians from the mid-twentieth 
century saw economic substantive due process doctrine and the 
progressive reaction as a debate about Darwinism.30 Henry Steele 
                                                                                                     
 25. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888) (“Manufacture is transformation—
the fashioning of raw materials into a change of form for use. The functions of 
commerce are different.”). 
 26. 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  
 27. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 28. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 53–74. 
 29. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 30. See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, LTD. 
82–90 (1941); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT, 
1860–1915 (1944) [hereinafter HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM]; HOVENKAMP, 
OPENING, supra note 6, at 23–24; ARNOLD M. PAUL, CONSERVATIVE CRISIS AND 
THE RULE OF LAW: ATTITUDES OF BAR AND BENCH, 1887–1895 (1960); HENRY 
STEELE COMMAGER, THE AMERICAN MIND: AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN 
THOUGHT AND CHARACTER SINCE THE 1880’S, at 82–90, 372–73 (1950); BENJAMIN 
 
PROGRESSIVE LEGAL THOUGHT 659 
Commager concluded that Holmes was “obviously wrong” and 
that the majority really did believe the Fourteenth Amendment 
enacted a form of Social Darwinism.31 While I believe this 
characterization of substantive due process is incorrect,32 the fact 
remains that it represents an important rejection of the idea that 
the resistance to the progressive revolution came mainly from 
“classical” legal thought. Darwin and its social science 
implications were just as inconsistent with and threatening to 
classical legal doctrine as progressive legal thought was. 
Further, Darwin was hardly the only—or even the 
dominant—source of the revolution. Economic thought also went 
through a profound revolution in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, and in ways that were to have a broad and 
lasting impact on legal policy. While the progressive direction of 
legal thought has produced plenty of critics, almost no one wants 
to roll the clock back on the marginalist revolution in economics. 
The impact of marginalism reached much more broadly than to 
self-styled progressives.33 As a result, the classical–progressive 
dichotomy gets the distribution of legal views very wrong. Most 
legal conservatives or libertarians who were literate in economics 
also embraced the marginalist revolution. 
Today the term “neoclassical” refers to economics since the 
rise of marginalism. The term is helpful because it realistically 
suggests a blending of old and new ideas rather than a complete 
rejection of everything that had gone before. For the most part, 
neoclassical economics preserved classicism’s preference for 
market exchange and private ownership. At the same time, 
however, the neoclassical conception of the market was far more 
complex than the classical conception, and the tools for market 
analysis became more technical.34 In the process many of the 
                                                                                                     
TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION: HOW LAISSEZ FAIRE CAME TO THE 
SUPREME COURT (1942).  
 31. COMMAGER, supra note 30, at 372–73. 
 32. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due 
Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 417–20 (1988) (discussing the limited influence of 
Social Darwinism on legal thought in the Gilded Age).   
 33. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 13–35, 75–90. 
 34. See id. at 32–33, 96–97. 
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classical conclusions about the value of competition and the harm 
caused by monopoly were preserved but qualified. 
The same thing is true of the largely simultaneous revolution 
in legal thought. For that reason the term “neoclassical” seems 
preferable to the term “progressive” here as well. Neoclassical 
legal thought included an expanded conception of market failure, 
a larger ratio of legislation to common law rules, and more 
regulation.35 But these ideas hardly eliminated either markets or 
the common law.36 The common law became less concerned with 
compensation for past harm done and more focused on risk 
management for the future, but most of it retained its character 
as judge-made law.37 While Grant Gilmore proclaimed the “death 
of contract” in 1974, contract law hardly died.38 Rather, it evolved 
into the great institutions of the First and Second Restatements 
and the Uniform Commercial Code.39 Neoclassical criminal law 
incorporated both theories of genetic inheritance and of marginal 
deterrence, but it never abandoned its concerns with morality or 
even retribution.40 Corporate law largely remained intact, even as 
it abandoned backward-looking theories of corporate finance 
expressed in the concept of par value shares and moved toward 
rational expectations models.41 These views were clearly 
                                                                                                     
 35. See id. at 2. 
 36. See id. (“Except at the far left, legal thinkers of this period believed that 
common law and capitalist legal institutions were worth preserving.”). 
 37. See id. at 123–58 (commenting on common law’s increasing orientation 
toward expectations and risk management). 
 38. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 3 (1974) (“We are told 
that Contract, like God, is dead. And so it is.”). 
 39. See id. at 67–69 (discussing the development of the Restatements and 
the Uniform Commercial Code). See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF THE LAW 
OF CONTRACTS (1931) (explaining general principles of contract law); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1975–1981) (same); U.C.C. 
(1942–1952) (providing a uniform model code for state laws regarding 
commercial transactions); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: A 
COMPREHENSIVE TREATISE ON THE WORKING RULES OF CONTRACT LAW (1950) 
(analyzing the rules of contract law and commenting on the Restatement). 
 40. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 36–52 (discussing 
progressive criminal theory, which was “a blend of biological determinism, 
marginal deterrence theory, and classical moralism”).  
 41. See id. at 159–83.  
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revisionist, but they were just as clearly not progressive.42 
Rather, they embraced changes in legal theory and doctrine that 
claimed much broader support than progressive legal thought 
ever did.43 
II. Neoclassical Economic Thought 
“Marginalism” equates value with reasonable expectations 
about the next choice.44 This was in sharp contrast to the classical 
political economists, who tended to see value as a consequence of 
previous decisions.45 Marginalism completely upended classical 
political economy’s theory of value by changing the perspective 
from backward to forward looking.46 For example, while 
classicists shared a strong belief that competition drives prices 
toward cost, the term “cost” usually meant an average of past 
expenses.47 By contrast, marginalists were able to articulate a 
much more precise relationship between prices and cost, first by 
the concept of “marginal” cost, or the anticipated cost of making 
one further unit in the future, and somewhat later, marginal 
revenue.48 Value became associated with marginal willingness-to-
pay or marginal willingness-to-accept.49 These tools enabled 
                                                                                                     
 42. See id. at 3–4. 
 43. See id. at 4. 
 44. See George J. Stigler, The Adoption of the Marginal Utility Theory, 4 
HIST. POL. ECON. 571, 572–75 (1972) (providing the history of marginalism). For 
a brief history, see HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27–35 (describing the 
development of marginalism). For a longer history focusing mainly on Britain 
and the European continent, see RICHARD S. HOWEY, THE RISE OF THE MARGINAL 
UTILITY SCHOOL: 1870–1889 (1989). 
 45. See, e.g., David Ricardo, Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value, in 4 
WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 357, 361 (Piero Sraffa & 
Maurice Dobb eds., 1951) (discussing Ricardo’s perspective on the measurement 
of value). For a brief history of classical value theory, written by a qualified 
defender, see Klaus Hagendorf, The Labor Theory of Value: A Marginal Analysis 
(Soc. Sci. Research Network, Working Paper No. 1958566), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1958566.  
 46. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 29. 
 47. See id. at 27–28. 
 48. See id. at 28. 
 49. See id. at 29.  
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marginalists to relate cost, value, and decision making with much 
greater clarity than the classicists had achieved.50 
Prior to the 1870s, Anglo-American political economy largely 
developed its theory of value from the amount of labor that went 
into something.51 In Adam Smith’s words, “The real price of 
everything . . . is the toil and trouble of acquiring it.”52 The 
relevant queries were backward looking, and typically located 
“value” by dividing total past investment by the number of units 
produced.53 
In sharp contrast, contemporary English political philosophy 
was increasingly utilitarian, particularly under the influence of 
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and John Austin (1790–1859).54 
Bentham developed sophisticated, forward-looking concepts of 
marginal deterrence in criminal law55 as well as declining 
marginal utility, or the idea that any good has less incremental 
value per unit as one acquires more of it.56 He also had a 
conception of “equilibrium,”—or the idea that things move from 
                                                                                                     
 50. See id. (“Marginalism greatly facilitated the development of distinctions 
between investment (fixed) costs and operating (variable) costs, and of the 
effects of decisions over time.”). 
 51. See MAURICE DOBB, THEORIES OF VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION SINCE ADAM 
SMITH: IDEOLOGY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 45 (1973) (discussing Adam Smith’s 
theory of labor value).  
 52. ADAM SMITH, INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS bk. I, at ch. 5.2 (1776). 
 53. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27–28. 
 54. See id. at 3 (noting Bentham and Austin’s influence on British legal 
thinking). 
 55. See id. at 28–29 (explaining that despite developing “both the concepts 
of declining marginal utility and marginal deterrence in criminal law,” Bentham 
neglected to develop marginalist theories of cost or value). 
 56. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE (c. 1793), 
reprinted in 1 WERNER STARK, JEREMY BENTHAM’S ECONOMIC WRITINGS: CRITICAL 
EDITION BASED ON HIS PRINTED WORKS AND UNPRINTED MANUSCRIPTS 113 (1952) 
(“[T]he quantity of happiness produced by a particle of wealth (each particle 
being of the same magnitude) will be less at every particle; the second will 
produce less than the first, the third less than the second, and so on.”); see also 
JEREMY BENTHAM, PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE, pt. 1, at ch. 6 (1802), reprinted 
in 1 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 304–07 (John Bowring ed., 1838) 
(discussing the effect of wealth on happiness). For Bentham’s influence on 
thinking about marginal deterrence, see BERNARD E. HARCOURT, THE ILLUSION 
OF FREE MARKETS: PUNISHMENT AND THE MYTH OF NATURAL ORDER 36–37, 103–20 
(2011). 
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lower to high utility and come to rest when utilities are 
equalized.57 
One enigma in nineteenth century British thought is the 
extent to which classical political economy and utilitarianism in 
political philosophy existed side by side, all the while 
encompassing inconsistent theories about value.58 The mystery is 
all the more perplexing because the French economist Augustin 
Cournot (1801–1877) had embraced marginalism much earlier 
and was known in England.59 His work was more mathematical, 
however, than anything that the English political economists did 
prior to the late nineteenth century.60 
Before economics could become marginalist, Bentham’s ideas 
about expected utility had to migrate from criminal law and 
politics into a theory of market exchange. Late in his life, John 
Stuart Mill began toying with marginalist ideas, although even 
today the extent of Mill’s marginalism is disputed.61 The real task 
of rewriting British political economy along marginalist lines fell 
to William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882), F.Y. Edgeworth (1845–
1926), and Alfred Marshall (1842–1924).62 By common belief, 
John Bates Clark in the United States (1847–1938) arrived at 
marginalism simultaneously, independently, and radically.63 
                                                                                                     
 57. See Werner Stark, Jeremy Bentham as an Economist, 56 ECON. J. 583, 
583–84 (1946) (explaining Bentham’s concept of equilibrium). 
 58. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27–28. 
 59. See MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 299–300 (4th ed. 
1985) (discussing Cournot’s influence on marginalist thought). 
 60. See id. at 317–19. 
 61. See N.B. de Marchi, Mill and Cairnes and the Emergence of 
Marginalism in England, in THE MARGINAL REVOLUTION IN ECONOMICS 78–97 
(R.D. Collison Black et al. eds., 1973) (discussing John Stuart Mill’s treatment of 
marginalist theory); John Stuart Mill, Notes on N.W. Senior’s Political Economy, 
reprinted in 12 ECONOMICA 134 (1945) (similar). 
 62. See BLAUG, supra note 59, at 300.   
 63. See JOHN BATES CLARK, THE PHILOSOPHY OF WEALTH: ECONOMIC 
PRINCIPLES NEWLY FORMULATED chs. 4–5 (1886) (analyzing production in 
marginalist terms); JOHN BATES CLARK, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH: A THEORY 
OF WAGES, INTEREST, AND PROFITS vi–vii (1899) (discussing marginal value and 
distribution); JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 870 (1950) 
(describing Clark as one of the “last of the claimants to independent discovery of 
the principle of marginal analysis”); Thomas Nixon Carver, The Marginal 
Theory of Distribution, 13 J. POL. ECON. 257, 260 (1905) (referencing Clark’s 
work on wealth distribution).  
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For the marginalists, all value lay in anticipations about the 
future.64 “Value depends entirely on utility,” Jevons wrote in the 
early 1870s, not on previous investment.65 Jevons then developed 
simple models of exchange, in which people traded to increase 
their personal utility.66 He showed that any individual would 
maximize value by trading up to the point that he had exactly the 
same marginal utility for everything.67 If there was an imbalance, 
he would make further trades until utilities were equalized.68 
From these principles, marginalists developed what eventually 
became a powerful set of mathematical tools to describe how the 
economy moves toward equilibrium.69 Alfred Marshall, who was 
obsessed with fluid mechanics, developed this idea much 
further.70 Justice Holmes, who was not an economist, later 
recognized its importance.71 
While the classical theory of value depended on purely 
material components relating to costs, marginalist value theory 
was behavioral, based on assumptions about how human beings 
make choices.72 It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of this 
difference between classical and neoclassical value theory. While 
classicists tended to see political economy as part of the law of 
nature, neoclassicists increasingly saw economics as part of social 
                                                                                                     
 64. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 27. 
 65. See WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 2, 
59–60 (1871) (explaining degrees of utility from consumption). 
 66. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 28–29 (discussing Jevons’s 
theories of exchange).  
 67. See id. (explaining Jevons’s concept of “equation of utilities”). 
 68. See id. at 29 (“When someone is satisfied with exactly what he has, ‘it 
follows that . . . an increment of commodity would yield exactly as much utility 
in one use as in another.’”). 
 69. See id. at 30–31 (discussing the marginalist understanding of 
equilibrium). 
 70. See id. at 31. 
 71. See id. (explaining Justice Holmes’s use of “equilibrium”); Stephen 
Diamond, Citizenship, Civilization, and Coercion: Justice Holmes on the Tax 
Power, in THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 115, 143 (Robert W. 
Gordon ed., 1992) (quoting Holmes’s letter of July 19, 1911, to Frank Taussig 
discussing Holmes’s perspective on wealth and equilibrium).  
 72. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 29–30. 
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science.73 The same thing occurred in elite legal theory, which 
moved from natural science to social science models as well.74 
Marginalism spread very quickly and by the turn of the 
century claimed many of America’s most prominent economists. 
These included John Bates Clark (Columbia),75 Irving Fisher 
(Yale),76 Francis Amasa Walker (Yale),77 Arthur Twining Hadley 
(Yale),78 Simon Newcomb (Johns Hopkins)79 and Charles Sanders 
Peirce (mainly U.S. Government, philosophy of science).80 It 
quickly became a staple in American economic treatises and 
texts.81 
                                                                                                     
 73. See id. at 16. 
 74. See id. at 7 (explaining that legal issues that had “been articulated in 
terms of natural law and morality were recast as problems of evolutionary social 
science and risk management”). 
 75. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing John Bates 
Clark’s opinions and scholarship on marginalism). 
 76. See, e.g., Irving Fisher, Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of 
Value and Prices, in 9 TRANSACTIONS OF THE CONNECTICUT ACADEMY 27, 38 
(1892) (diagraming marginal utility). 
 77. See FRANCIS AMASA WALKER, THE WAGES QUESTION: A TREATISE ON 
WAGES AND THE WAGES CLASS 138–48 (1876) (rejecting the wage fund doctrine); 
FRANCIS AMASA WALKER, POLITICAL ECONOMY 99–105 (1883) (illustrating 
principles of final utility in market exchange).   
 78. See ARTHUR TWINING HADLEY, ECONOMICS: AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
RELATIONS BETWEEN PRIVATE PROPERTY AND PUBLIC WELFARE 78–79 (1898) 
(explaining marginal utility theory). 
 79. See, e.g., D.W. Goodwin, Marginalism Moves to the New World, 4 HIST. 
POL. ECON. 551, 558–59 (1972) (discussing Simon Newcomb’s career and his 
development as a marginalist); Simon Newcomb, On the Method and Province of 
Political Economy, 121 N. AM. REV. 241 (1875) (analyzing principles of political 
economy pertaining to domestic industry); Simon Newcomb, The Theory of 
Political Economy, 114 N. AM. REV. 435 (1872) (reviewing WILLIAM STANLEY 
JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1871) and analyzing Jevons’s work 
on marginal utility). 
 80. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 138–39 (discussing Peirce’s 
contributions to marginalist economics). 
 81. See, e.g., CHARLES J. BULLOCK, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
ECONOMICS 91–97 (1897) (distinguishing between total and marginal utility); 
HERBERT J. DAVENPORT, OUTLINES OF ELEMENTARY ECONOMICS 62–66 (1897) 
(explaining the doctrine of “margins,” utility, and value); EDWARD T. DEVINE, 
ECONOMICS 189 (1898) (explaining marginal utility’s relationship with a 
community’s valuation of goods); RICHARD T. ELY, OUTLINES OF ECONOMICS 121–
25 (1893) (exploring marginalist concepts of value and utility); FRANK A. FETTER, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS WITH APPLICATIONS TO PRACTICAL PROBLEMS 23–27 
(1904) (defining marginal utility and its relationship to value); IRVING FISHER, 
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At the same time, there were notable outliers on both the left 
and the right. Thorstein Veblen, the grandparent of left-leaning 
American institutionalism, opposed marginalism because in his 
mind its stripped-down theory of rational decision making was 
not sufficiently evolutionary and did not give an adequate 
account of human behavior.82 On the far right was Yale’s William 
Graham Sumner, a Social Darwinist and defender of classicism 
who wrote more as a public intellectual than an economist.83 
By the turn of the century, marginalist ideas were attaining 
widespread acceptance in American universities, both inside and 
outside of formal economics.84 Marginalism was also ideologically 
diverse, capturing both left-leaning as well as more conservative 
economists. On the left was institutionalist labor economist John 
R. Commons, who was an important American developer of 
marginalist theory before he identified himself with 
institutionalism and labor economics.85 The same was true of tax 
                                                                                                     
ELEMENTARY PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 286–95 (1911) (analyzing demand and its 
relationship to marginal desirability); HADLEY, supra note 78 and accompanying 
text (discussing marginal utility theory); HENRY R. SEAGER, INTRODUCTION TO 
ECONOMICS 89–92 (1904) (explaining valuation of goods and marginal utility 
both as a social process and in an industrial society); EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, 
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO AMERICAN CONDITIONS 
192 (1905) (explaining that the utility, or value, of a commodity is equivalent to 
the cost of the labor); FRANK W. TAUSSIG, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 120–37 
(1911) (applying and analyzing marginal utility). 
 82. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 34 (noting Veblen’s 
criticisms of marginalist theories); Thorstein Veblen, Why Is Economics Not an 
Evolutionary Science?, 12 Q.J. ECON. 373, 384 (1898) (criticizing the lack of 
evolutionary understanding in marginalism); Thorstein Veblen, The Limitations 
of Marginal Utility, 17 J. POL. ECON. 620, 620–21 (1909) (criticizing marginal 
utility theory’s failure to include a theory of growth and change).  
 83. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 25–27 (discussing Sumner’s 
perspective on social evolution); WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, COLLECTED ESSAYS IN 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 16–17 (1885) (arguing against monopolies in 
favor of competition for supply and demand to achieve equilibrium). 
 84. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 33 (“After 1900, both 
economic and legal thought were increasingly dominated by a mixture of 
Darwinian and marginalist principles, with marginalism taking an increasing 
role.”). On the use of marginalist analysis by non-economists, see DOROTHY 
ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE 389 (1991).   
 85. See, e.g., JOHN R. COMMONS, THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH (London, 
Macmillan & Co., 1893) (developing theories of distribution and discussing 
marginal utility as it applies to the theories). 
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economist Edwin R.A. Seligman, who incorporated marginalist 
economics into his studies about the shifting and incidence of 
taxation as well as his advocacy of a graduated income tax.86 
More conservative and laissez-faire economists who adopted 
marginalist analysis included John Bates Clark (Columbia),87 J. 
Laurence Laughlin (University of Chicago),88 Arthur Twining 
Hadley, who became a long-serving president of Yale 
University,89 and later Harvard’s Frank Taussig, who was more 
moderate.90 Indeed, early criticism of American antitrust policy, a 
progressive innovation, came from marginalist economists such 
as Hadley, who believed that antitrust would interfere with firms’ 
ability to reach efficient size through merger or collaboration.91 
                                                                                                     
 86. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 98–102 (discussing 
Seligman’s work on progressive taxes and shifting tax burdens); EDWIN R.A. 
SELIGMAN, THE SHIFTING AND INCIDENCE OF TAXATION 165–76 (rev. ed. 1899) 
(discussing the “mathematical theory” of the incidence of taxation including the 
work of marginalists); Edwin R.A. Seligman, On the Shifting and Incidence of 
Taxation, 7 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 7, 119–20 (1892) (discussing the relationship 
between taxation and the law of value); Edwin R.A. Seligman, Progressive 
Taxation in Theory and Practice, 9 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 1, 132–33 (1894) 
(discussing theories of value in advocating for a progressive income tax); Edwin 
R.A. Seligman, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 8 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 52, 
53 (1893) (“[T]he marginal utility theory of value was held to furnish an 
irrefragable proof of the necessity of progression.”). For an extended history of 
Progressive Era tax policy, including Seligman’s role, see AJAY K. MEHROTRA, 
MAKING THE MODERN AMERICAN FISCAL STATE: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE RISE OF 
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION, 1877–1929 (2013). 
 87. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing John Bates 
Clark’s views on marginalism). 
 88. See ROSS, supra note 84, at 175–76 (discussing the gradual transition of 
classical economists to marginalist thought).  
 89. See HADLEY, supra note 78 and accompanying text (referencing 
marginal utility theory). See generally Arthur T. Hadley, Economic Laws and 
Methods, 8 SCI. 46 (1886) (analyzing and explaining the relationship between 
economics and jurisprudence). 
 90. See FRANK TAUSSIG, 2 PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 153–63 (1913) 
(discussing the relationship between wages and value as well as how marginal 
utility governs value). 
 91. See THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC SOURCES 
72 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2012) (discussing Hadley’s 
position that monopoly or collusion were essential for certain industries to avoid 
bankruptcy); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and the Rise of 
Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105, 125–27 (1989) (explaining 
Hadley’s theory that “competition would force capital-intensive industries to 
charge ruinous prices” that would ultimately end in bankruptcy).  
668 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653 (2015) 
The prominent Johns Hopkins public intellectual Simon 
Newcomb, who wrote in many areas of science and mathematics 
as well as economics, was both a marginalist and a staunch 
defender of laissez-faire economics.92 Newcomb’s fierce debates in 
the 1880s with progressive economist Richard T. Ely drew the 
battle lines over the future of the discipline. The debate focused 
on whether marginalism was consistent with laissez-faire 
political theory.93 
During the decades following Reconstruction, both 
Darwinian and marginalist ideas went from controversial to 
mainstream, with dissenters increasingly shunted to the 
sidelines.94 These ideas eventually captured virtually all the 
American academy in their respective fields. By the 1920s, pretty 
much everyone with a thoughtful opinion had embraced both 
biological evolution and marginalist economics.95 
In that case, just how much of the contemporaneous 
revolution in legal thought was really progressive, and how much 
reflected a much broader revolution that accommodated these 
disruptive ideas in different ways? By and large, those who 
lament the progressive revolution in legal thought today would 
not turn the clock back on marginalist economics and, for the 
most part, not on Darwinian evolution either. But 
accommodating the theory of evolution and marginalist analysis 
required so much revision of classical legal thought that it could 
no longer be called “classical.” Further, legal progressivism by 
                                                                                                     
 92. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 86. 
 93. See Richard T. Ely, The Past and the Present of Political Economy, in 2 
JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 143, 
151–52 (1884) (opposing laissez-faire); Simon Newcomb, The Two Schools of 
Political Economy, 14 PRINCETON REV. 291, 291–92 (1884) (criticizing Ely). The 
debate was originally published in Science magazine and later collected as 
Science Economic Discussion (1886). See ALBERT E. MOYER, A SCIENTIST’S VOICE 
IN AMERICAN CULTURE: SIMON NEWCOMB AND THE RHETORIC OF SCIENTIFIC 
METHOD 108–26 (1992) (providing a detailed discussion of debates between 
Newcomb and Ely and their respective positions).  
 94. See HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM, supra note 30, at 4–7 (discussing 
Darwinism’s effect and reception in the United States). 
 95. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 33 (discussing the 
institutional and political support for both Darwinism and marginalism). 
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and large did not carry these ideas any further, although it did 
spin them in different directions. 
Darwinism and marginalism both had profound and 
simultaneous influences on American legal thought.96 Ironically, 
however, they were built on fiercely inconsistent assumptions 
about human nature.97 Their preferred methodologies of social 
control were very different as well.98 They managed to occupy 
common intellectual turf principally among the early 
progressives, as well as legal scholars, who used ideas more 
promiscuously than most scientists and social scientists did.99 
Darwinians believed that human beings, like all organisms 
including plants, had an instinct for survival that dominated 
everything else, even conscious choice.100 Further, this instinct 
was forever and relentlessly reactionary against the environment, 
making the concept of free choice almost meaningless.101 For the 
Darwinian social scientist, the human being was a body, and the 
mind merely one of its many organs seeking survival.102 Speaking 
of Darwinian instrumentalist John B. Watson, Justice Holmes 
wrote Harold Laski in 1928 that Watson was “so preoccupied 
with resolving all our conduct into reflex reactions to stimuli, that 
he almost denies that consciousness means anything and that 
memory is more than a useless and misleading word.”103 
                                                                                                     
 96. See id. at 3. 
 97. See id. at 15–16 (explaining that Darwinians believed that choices were 
based on survival instincts, whereas marginalists believed that decision making 
was an autonomous event).  
 98. See id. at 16–17 (noting that marginalists believed social control was 
incentive based, while Darwinists believed that the individual was fixed at 
birth). 
 99. See id. at 33–34. 
 100. See HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM, supra note 30, at 6 (“The most 
popular catchwords of Darwinism ‘struggle for existence’ and ‘survival of the 
fittest,’ when applied to the life of man in society, suggested that nature would 
provide that the best competitors in a competitive situation would win.”). 
 101. See id. at 164 (discussing Darwinian beliefs that “‘social hindrances’ 
cannot prevent men of high ability from becoming eminent, and . . . ‘social 
advantages are incompetent to give that status to a man of moderate ability’”). 
 102. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 15. 
 103. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold Laski (Nov. 23, 1928), 
in 2 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND 
HAROLD J. LASKI: 1916–1935, at 1113 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953). 
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In sharp contrast, marginalism was built on a rational-
expectations model that saw the human being entirely as a mind, 
whose choices might or might not benefit the body.104 The 
marginalist mind, in sharp distinction from that of the 
Darwinian, was rational and autonomous, developing and 
asserting preferences to maximize its position within its 
environment.105 Further, as marginalist economics became more 
rigorous in the 1930s, it virtually ruled out all inquiry into the 
biological or other external sources of preference.106 Such 
investigations were not within the boundaries of economic 
science.107 
Followed to their logical conclusions, these inconsistent views 
about human nature led to completely incompatible philosophies 
of social control. For the Darwinian, any particular individual’s 
deviant harmful conduct could not be controlled except by 
incarceration.108 The only way to address the problem over the 
longer run was through sterilization or sexual isolation—a 
proposition that many American progressives embraced.109 By 
contrast, the marginalist believed that persons would respond 
rationally to rewards and penalties.110 As a result, punishment 
could be metered to the offense. In The Path of the Law, as 
observed below, Holmes categorically aligned himself with the 
marginalists.111 
                                                                                                     
 104. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 15 (“By contrast, 
marginalism saw the human being as a highly rational mind, controlling a body 
that would prosper or not from the mind’s choices.”). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. at 16 (“Marginalist economists increasingly came to think that 
human preferences are autonomous, or at least that science could not uncover 
their origins.”). 
 107. See id. (“[T]he enterprise of searching for a common biological or social 
structure that linked the preferences of different individuals was ostracized 
from economic science.”). 
 108. See id. at 36 (noting that many Darwinists believed that criminal 
behavior was an inherited quality and that individuals were not responsible for 
their behavior).  
 109. See id. at 42–47 (discussing theories of criminality and compulsory 
sterilizations). 
 110. See id. (“[M]arginalism saw criminal and other antisocial conduct 
mainly as a problem in metering sanctions.”). 
 111. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 
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III. Neoclassical Legal Policy 
Marginalism’s forward-looking theory of value was a 
revolution in human perspective about choice and decision 
making. It also posed formidable administrative difficulties. 
Either Yogi Berra or physics Nobel laureate Niels Bohr once 
observed that “prediction is very difficult, especially if it’s about 
the future.”112 No matter the author, the point is important. The 
forward looking view of the world opened up by marginalist 
thought involved much more uncertainty than anything that 
economic classicists had considered. To be useful for policy and 
prediction, both economics and legal theory developed an idea of 
rational expectations, or the reasonable foresight of an average 
person, to manage decision making about value.113 His ability to 
capture this insight made Holmes America’s greatest marginalist 
in turn-of-the-century legal policy.114 
One important result, strongly influenced by Holmes, was a 
revolution in the common law of contracts, property, and tort: 
changing their focus from compensation for past harm done 
toward management of risks and ongoing relationships.115 The 
law of commercial contracts abandoned its strict requirements of 
previously agreed upon price, quantity, product, and terms of 
delivery.116 Instead, neoclassical contract law evolved toward 
increasing acceptance of open-ended arrangements that looked to 
the furtherance of future relationships, requiring business firms 
                                                                                                     
457, 458, 461, 471, 473–74 (1897) (espousing marginalist theories such as 
forward-looking views of legal duties and value, the circumstances of crimes, 
and the perspective that a criminal’s character is not dispositive); infra notes 
167–185 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed discussion of Holmes 
as a marginalist). 
 112. ARTHUR K. ELLIS, TEACHING AND LEARNING ELEMENTARY SOCIAL STUDIES 
431 (3d ed. 1986); see also Ronald J. Allen, Complexity, the Generation of Legal 
Knowledge, and the Future of Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1384, 1386 n.1 (2013) 
(noting that authorship of the statement is in doubt). 
 113. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 151.   
 114. See infra notes 257–268 and accompanying text. 
 115. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 122.  
 116. See id. at 126 (stating that changes in contract law “undermined the 
traditional rule that a contract was not ‘complete’ unless it contained a specified 
price, a specified quantity and a specified good or service”). 
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to behave within rationally expected parameters but not 
necessarily specifying price, quantity, or other specific terms.117 
These developments were aided by the creation of neoclassical 
profit-maximization models that made it possible to predict 
objectively rational business decisions, although not necessarily 
noncommercial behavior.118 Aided by the rise of actuarial science, 
tort law adopted probabilistic theories of causation, shared 
liability, and risk management.119 Included was a growing 
appreciation of strict liability as a device for forcing 
manufacturers to internalize the social cost of defective 
products.120  
Marginalism’s reorientation of decision theory toward future 
expectations was much more realistic about the way people 
behave.121 At the same time, however, incorporating these 
forward-looking conceptions of human behavior destabilized legal 
policy.122 The range of predicted values is much larger than the 
range of averaged values taken from the past. Marx aside, 
classical political economy never developed pronounced 
interventionist views in distinction from accepted laissez-faire 
alternatives.123 Marginalism, by contrast, broke down quickly into 
left- and right-leaning views, both of which were generally 
consistent with the marginalist assumptions of the day.124 
                                                                                                     
 117. See id. (noting increased enforcement of “output” or “requirement” 
contracts for unspecified quantities).  
 118. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 123–29 (discussing the 
growing divide between commercial and noncommercial contracts). 
 119. See id. at 144–45 (describing changes in the tort system, including the 
development of risk analysis, actuarial science, and industrial developments 
that made negligence more common, and causation more complex).  
 120. See id. at 148–50 (discussing the development of strict liability theory 
through the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and its application to the Coca-Cola 
bottle cases). 
 121. See id. at 129.  
 122. See id. at 129–50.  
 123. See id. at 6 (“Classical economic thought was unified by a historical 
theory of value and a deep hostility toward State interference in private 
arrangements.”).  
 124. See id. at 7 (explaining that marginalism has “gyrated among political 
ideologies” and “breaks apart into radically different views”).  
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A. Market Diversity and Failure: Antitrust and Regulation 
As marginalist economics became formalized, particularly in 
the writings of F.Y. Edgeworth and Alfred Marshall, economists 
and later lawyers increasingly came to believe two things. First, 
markets differ from one another.125 Second, the conditions for 
robust competition are met less often than the classical political 
economists had assumed, making markets more prone to 
failure.126 Marginalist economists of every political stripe 
accepted these propositions, although they differed as to the 
amount as well as about policy implications.127 Further, their 
views changed over time. 
Notwithstanding his near-socialism on questions of wealth 
redistribution, the great Cambridge University economist Alfred 
Marshall managed to produce the most important industrial 
economics book of his era, and it was largely committed to 
determining the conditions of competition, with monopoly as an 
occasional exception.128 However, certain problems emerged in 
Marshall’s formulation of competition theory.129 Under his model 
of marginal-cost pricing, competitive firms with fixed costs would 
end up cutting prices to the point that they could not recover 
their capital investment.130 The result was “ruinous competition” 
that would work itself out until only one firm remained in the 
market.131 For this reason a significant group of economists 
                                                                                                     
 125. See id. at 35.  
 126. See George J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 
65 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1957). 
 127. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 82 (describing the range of 
beliefs among marginalists over market failure and other economic theories).  
 128. See ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 5–6 (1890). 
 129. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 206 (explaining that 
“marginalist analysis and even Marshall’s own work threw the economic study 
of industry into division and disarray” because of its issues with competition).  
 130. See id. (“[C]ompetition forces prices towards immediate costs without 
leaving enough to cover capital costs. . . . [T]his ‘ruinous competition’ problem 
was generalized to all industries with significant fixed costs.”).  
 131. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Coase, Institutionalism, and the Origins of 
Law and Economics, 86 IND. L.J. 499, 533 (2011) (“[C]ompetition was thought to 
become ‘ruinous’ as each firm cut its price to marginal cost without having 
enough left over to pay off fixed costs. Firms would either go out of business 
until only a single monopoly firm remained or else they would be forced to 
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opposed the newly enacted Sherman Act,132 while progressives 
tended to favor it.133 The mainstream marginalist view was 
mainly premised on the idea that fixed costs and economies of 
scale dictated large firm size and that any attempt to intervene 
would be counterproductive.134 For example, the “ruinous 
competition” antitrust defense was presented to the courts as a 
justification for railroad price fixing.135 
Marshall himself was never able to solve the problem of fixed 
costs satisfactorily.136 The problem was perceived most strongly 
in the railroads, the large industry with the highest proportion of 
                                                                                                     
collude.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis, 
1890–1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311, 320–22 (2009) (explaining the marginalist 
disfavor of antitrust policy). 
 132. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (enacted 1890); see also Henry Rand Hatfield, The 
Chicago Trust Conference, 8 J. POL. ECON. 1, 6 (1899) (noting that the majority 
of the economists present at the conference favored consolidation of large 
businesses). The proceedings of this meeting were published as Chicago 
Conference on Trusts: Speeches, Debates, Resolutions (1900). See MAKING OF 
COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 91, at 72 (noting the difference in marginalist 
and progressive perspectives of the Sherman Act).  
 133. See, e.g., RICHARD T. ELY, MONOPOLIES AND TRUSTS 240–41 (1912) 
(noting methods used to counteract monopolies); CHARLES R. VAN HISE, 
CONCENTRATION AND CONTROL 174–92 (1912) (discussing the Sherman Act and 
its effectiveness); TRUSTS, POOLS AND CORPORATIONS (William Z. Ripley ed., rev. 
ed. 1916) (noting the need for the Sherman Act to address “unfair practices” in 
business).  
 134. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 206 (explaining that the 
concern over ruinous competition led many economists to believe that the only 
solution was “monopoly or collusion” and that the government could not resolve 
the problem).  
 135. See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 576 (1898) 
(“[T]he only resort open to railroads to save themselves from the effects of a 
ruinous competition is that of agreements among themselves to check and 
control it. A ruinous competition is, as they say, apt to be carried on until the 
weakest of the combatants goes to destruction.”); United States v. Addyston 
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 279 (6th Cir. 1898) (noting that defendants argued 
that “each member would be subjected to ruinous competition by the other” 
without an internal agreement); HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, at 
312–13 (noting that the “ruinous competition” defense had been accepted by 
courts in price-fixing cases); Ann Mayhew, How American Economists Came to 
Love the Sherman Antitrust Act, 30 HIST. POL. ECON. 179, 191–92 (Supp. 1998) 
(discussing economists’ defense of trusts to prevent “cut-throat competition” and 
“ruinous losses”).  
 136. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 207–09.  
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fixed costs.137 Within that environment, price regulation emerged 
as a defensible, if imperfect, solution.138 Eventually economists 
began to develop more complex models of competitive behavior 
taking price discrimination139 and product differentiation into 
account.140 These largely brought the fixed controversy to an end. 
Historians writing about regulation have tended to 
emphasize political over economic and technical issues.141 
Initially most of them saw regulation as the outcome of a war 
between capitalist defenders of laissez-faire economics and new 
progressive ideas.142 Later, the dominant view came to be that 
                                                                                                     
 137. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, at 311. 
 138. See, e.g., ISAIAH L. SHARFMAN, RAILWAY REGULATION: AN ANALYSIS OF 
THE UNDERLYING PROBLEMS IN RAILWAY ECONOMICS FROM THE STANDPOINT OF 
GOVERNMENT REGULATION 19 (1918)  
Railway rivalry tends to be abnormally keen and competition ruinous. 
This in turn, leads to co-operation in various forms. . . . Competing 
railway companies . . . either consent to a truce whereby competition 
between them is abolished and arrive at an agreement for the 
maintenance of rates, or continue their warfare until one of the roads 
is driven to insolvency.  
Sharfman was a professor of political economy at the University of Michigan. 
See also WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION 259, 293 (1912) 
(describing how railroads acting in competition might either set rates or 
establish agreements to avoid waste in transportation). Ripley was a Harvard 
University professor of economics. See HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE, supra note 22, 
at 311–12 (explaining Hadley’s theory of ruinous competition and noting that 
the combination appeared to be the only solution).  
 139. See generally JOHN MAURICE CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF 
OVERHEAD COSTS 35–69 (1923) (discussing differential costs and price 
discrimination). 
 140. See EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 
71–73 (1933) (explaining product differentiation under monopolistic 
competition); JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 4–5 
(1933) (discussing product differentiation and monopoly). 
 141. See Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict, supra note 21, at 1018 (noting 
that historical studies of regulation focus more on politics and less on regulatory 
theories developed by economists of that time). 
 142. See, e.g., HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE OF LAISSEZ FAIRE: 1897–
1917, at 368–79 (1977) (discussing the impact of progressive ideologies on 
government regulation); RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 228–29 
(1955) (discussing the conflict over regulation between large corporate 
businesses and progressive ideals); EDWARD C. KIRKLAND, A HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC LIFE 613 (1932) (discussing the growing opposition to “big 
business”).  
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most regulation was actually passed at the behest of regulated 
firms who wanted to relieve themselves from the rigors of 
competition.143 
In retrospect, it seems clear that the railroad industry was 
threatened with both ruinous competition and monopoly, 
depending on the circumstances.144 Among historians, both sides 
of the regulation story give short shrift to the significant amount 
of technical economic work that sought to define when regulatory 
intervention was appropriate and what were its proper 
boundaries.145 That debate was heavily driven by differing 
conceptions about the nature and ubiquity of market failure.146 
Writing in the first half of the twentieth century, progressive 
historians painted a picture of the nineteenth century as a 
laissez-faire state until progressive government regulation 
developed as a response to late nineteenth century abuses as well 
as the labor movement.147 The critique created a seriously 
exaggerated image of hostility toward government regulation.148 
At the same time, the domain of nineteenth century 
regulation was significantly narrower than it became after the 
Progressive Era.149 Earlier regulation fell mainly within the 
                                                                                                     
 143. See KOLKO, infra note 164 and accompanying text (discussing the 
capture theory of regulation). 
 144. See Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict, supra note 21, at 1044  
If the railroads were permitted to have unregulated monopolies, rate 
gouging and large monopoly profits at the expense of carriers were 
sure to result. . . . [I]f the railroads were forced to compete with each 
other . . . railroad rates would almost certainly be driven to a level too 
low to cover fixed costs, eventually forcing railroads into bankruptcy. 
 145. See id. at 1021. 
 146. See id. at 1017. 
 147. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 159 (arguing that 
Progressive-Era historians tended to favor the narrative which presented the 
development of business policy as part of a “survival of the fittest,” in which the 
government favored big business and disfavored the labor movement).  
 148. See id. at 278 (“The United States had a strong tradition of regulation 
at every governmental level that stretched back to the commonwealth ideal of 
Revolutionary times and maintained a growing presence throughout the 
nineteenth century.”); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW & 
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA ix (1996) (arguing that the 
idealized laissez-faire state never existed and that nineteenth century America 
was actually a well-regulated state). 
 149. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 243 (describing the 
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triumvirate of “health, safety, or morals” that was clearly 
recognized in Gilded Age case law as well as the contemporary 
constitutional treatise writers.150 Under this view, which came to 
define the boundaries of substantive due process constitutional 
analysis, the state had authority to intervene to protect the 
morals of everyone from their own degenerate inclinations.151 By 
contrast, health or safety concerns justified regulation when the 
feared injury was on third parties who were not in a position to 
bargain over an issue.152 For example, in Lochner, Justice 
Peckham condemned the bakers’ ten-hour provision because he 
could not find a relationship between the ten-hour rule and the 
“healthful quality of the bread” that the bakers produced.153 As 
adult individuals with contractual capacity, the bakers could 
bargain about their own personal health and well-being, but 
bread consumers were not participants in that bargain.154 Three 
years later, attorney Louis Dembitz Brandeis was able to turn the 
Court on this issue by writing a “social science” brief whose 
argument was divided into three parts, dealing with the effect of 
long working hours on women’s “health, safety, and morals.”155 
                                                                                                     
substantive due process era and the Court’s reluctance to interfere with contract 
or property rights).  
 150. See id. at ch. 13 (listing “health, safety, and morals” triumvirate as 
qualifications on economic substantive due process).  
 151. See id. at 256. 
 152. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) (explaining that 
statutes limiting work hours are not within a state’s police power unless 
reasonable grounds exist to indicate “some material danger to the public health 
or to the health of the employees”). 
 153. See id. at 62 (explaining that any connection between work hours and 
bread quality is “too shadowy and thin to build any argument for the 
interference of the legislature”). 
 154. See id. (“There is no contention that bakers as a class are not equal in 
intelligence and capacity to men in other trades . . . or that they are not able to 
assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting arm of the 
State”); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 250 (noting that Justice 
Peckham rejected the notion that regulation was needed to protect consumer 
interests, and found that the bakers were capable of making contracts). 
 155. See Brief for Defendant in Error at 28–46, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 
412 (1908) (No. 107) (focusing on the harm to women’s health, safety and 
morals); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 249–51 (discussing the 
importance and influence of this aspect of Brandeis Brief). 
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The health, safety, and morals triumvirate dominated 
constitutional discussion about the limits of economic regulation 
during the Gilded Age.156 The phrase was used in forty-four 
published judicial opinions prior to 1890, an additional 100 cases 
between 1890 and 1900, and in another 1,100 cases between 1900 
and 1930. After the United States v. Carolene Products Co.157 
decision announced the end of close federal judicial scrutiny of 
economic regulation, the health, safety, and morals triumvirate 
became relatively unimportant.158 It gave way to more secular 
theories of market failure that justified regulation on economic 
grounds.159 
While the economic theory of regulation since Carolene 
Products has divided into differing opinions about its social value 
and harm, the dominant ones are all marginalist and all center 
on two questions. The first concerns the pervasiveness of market 
failure. The second concerns the ability of the political system to 
recognize market failure and do something constructive about 
it.160 Any divide between conservatives and progressives showed 
up mainly in issues of degree. Further, to the extent that the 
political case against regulation is libertarian,161 those views are 
not classical either. The classical theory opposing regulation in 
the United States included a strongly moral and thus anti-
libertarian set of exceptions—even permitting such things as the 
uncompensated shutdown of distilleries that had been legal when 
they were built, Sunday work, or commercial transactions.162 
                                                                                                     
 156. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 251.  
 157. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 158. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 262.  
 159. See id. (explaining that regulation based on purely economic 
considerations was an “important consequence of the marginalist revolution”).  
 160. See id. (describing the differing approaches to market failure).  
 161. See, e.g., JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF 
CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 55–56 (1962) 
(arguing that regulations such as zoning are unnecessary because it is in private 
parties’ greater interest to reach private contractual arrangements); RICHARD A. 
EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST FOR 
LIMITED GOVERNMENT ix (2014) (arguing that “classical liberal theory” 
encompasses libertarian ideals such as “private property” and “limited 
government”). 
 162. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 255–62 (describing 
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The progressive critique of regulation argued that regulation 
was in the public interest and intended to bring monopoly under 
control.163 The rejection of that position came from both political 
sides. New Left historian Gabriel Kolko argued that, far from 
reflecting progressive concerns to control monopoly, railroad 
regulation was actually instigated by the railroads themselves as 
protection from excessive competition and bankruptcy.164 
This regulatory capture thesis also became a staple of more 
right-leaning libertarians and the Chicago School, all driven by 
marginalist conceptions.165 For example, Buchanan and Tullock’s 
Calculus of Consent conducted an extensive marginalist analysis 
of individual rational decision making and its relationship to 
social choice.166 Mancur Olson, whose influential book The Logic 
                                                                                                     
regulations based on “moral” campaigns, including lotteries, alcohol, and 
“Sunday laws,” which prohibited work or contract enforcement on Sundays). 
 163. See, e.g., 2 CHARLES BEARD & MARY BEARD, THE RISE OF AMERICAN 
CIVILIZATION 166–210 (1928) (discussing the rise of “economic barons” and 
legislative attempts to control monopolies); EMORY RICHARD JOHNSON & 
THURMAN WILLIAM VAN METRE, PRINCIPLES OF RAILROAD TRANSPORTATION 499–
508 (1926) (discussing the need for railroad regulation and the effect of that 
regulation); WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, RAILROADS: RATES AND REGULATION, supra note 
138, at 467–73 (discussing the effect of legal cases that limited rate-making 
power and the harm caused by those limitations); 1 ISAIAH LEO SHARFMAN, THE 
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND 
PROCEDURE 17–19 (1931) (discussing the background of the demand for federal 
regulation to control railroad monopolies); Martin Knapp, The Regulation of 
Railway Rates, 6 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 20, 20 (1905) (advocating for regulation 
of railroads by “public authority”); Hugo R. Meyer, Government Regulation of 
Railway Rates, 7 PUB. AM. ECON. ASS’N 61, 61–62 (1906) (discussing federal 
railroad regulation); William Z. Ripley, Public Regulation of Railroad Issues, 4 
AM. ECON. REV. 541, 541 (1914) (arguing for railroad regulations to benefit the 
public interest). The most influential defense of regulation in the public interest 
was JAMES LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
 164. See GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877–1916, at 3 
(1965); Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict, supra note 21, at 1020 (explaining that 
federal regulation of railroads was supported by the railroads).  
 165. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. 
ECON. MGM’T SCI. 335, 335–36 (1974) (explaining regulatory capture theory); 
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3, 4 
(1971) (understanding that regulation is a “problem of discovering when and 
why an industry . . . is able to use the state for its purposes”). 
 166. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 161, at vi (explaining that the 
goal of the book is to “analyze the calculus of the rational individual” in regard 
to decisions about constitutional issues).  
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of Collective Action became among the most popular defenses of 
the regulatory capture theory,167 developed it entirely out of the 
neoclassical theory of how cartels discipline themselves.168 He 
borrowed heavily from his thesis advisor Edward Chamberlin, 
whose Theory of Monopolistic Competition had been published 
thirty years earlier.169 
The regulatory capture argument picked up one important 
theme from substantive due process analysis. In Lochner, Justice 
Peckham had professed suspicion that legislation such as the ten-
hour law was in fact passed for “other motives” than the 
justifications offered for it.170 He did not identify the interest 
groups behind the law, however, although they were already well 
known at the time.171 Peckham suggested that a proffered motive 
was to assure the “healthful quality of the bread,” but then added 
that in the Court’s judgment it was “not possible in fact” to 
discover that connection.172 
Justice Peckham’s empirical conclusion is odd; not only had 
no one shown a relationship between workers’ hours and the 
                                                                                                     
 167. See TUCK, infra note 169, at 3 (stating the importance of The Logic of 
Collective Action). 
 168. See MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 6–7 (1965) (challenging traditional view that 
organizations further members’ interests). 
 169. See id. at 9–24 (relying on EDWARD CHAMBERLIN, THEORY OF 
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1933)); RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 3 (2008) 
(noting Chamberlin’s influence on Olson’s work). Chamberlin had been Olson’s 
thesis advisor but died before it was finished. See J. Barkley Rosser, Jr., The 
Rise and Decline of Mancur Olson’s View of the Rise and Decline of Nations, 74 
SO. ECON. J. 4, 4 n.2 (2007) (noting that Thomas C. Schelling finished 
supervising Olson’s thesis after Chamberlin died in 1962). 
 170. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (“It is impossible for us 
to shut our eyes to the fact that many of the laws of this character, while passed 
under what is claimed to be the police power for the purpose of protecting the 
public health or welfare, are, in reality, passed from other motives.”). 
 171. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 26–28 (2011) (discussing the 
role that the bakers’ union and other groups played in passing and enforcing the 
Bakeshop Act); HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 247–48, 271–73 
(discussing the impact and influence of labor unions and women’s public action 
groups, especially in the Bakeshop Act).  
 172. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63. 
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quality of the product, but it was impossible to do so.173 Whether 
or not that was true in 1905, the fact is that economic substantive 
due process analysis was never good at identifying special 
interest capture because it never developed any empirical or 
other litigation tools for doing so.174 The case law either assumed 
capture or else was indifferent to the question, concluding that 
liberty of contract outweighed any market failure effects, whether 
present or not.175 One defeated this premise not by showing an 
absence of capture, but rather by showing that the regulation in 
question pertained to health, safety, or morals.176 
But Carolene Products, which completely rejected Lochner’s 
approach to economic regulation, did not do any better. Its highly 
deferential standard made legislative capture irrelevant to 
constitutional analysis unless the regulation in question invaded 
some explicit constitutional right or was so biased that it violated 
even rational basis Equal Protection analysis.177 Carolene 
Products itself illustrates the problem. The federal regulation at 
issue prohibited “filled milk,” which consisted of milk to which a 
small amount of oil had been added that enabled it to whip.178 It 
was cheaper than dairy cream, healthier by today’s standards, 
and performed better.179 Carolene produced it under the name 
                                                                                                     
 173. See id. at 62 (“In our judgment it is not possible in fact to discover the 
connection between the number of hours a baker may work in the bakery and 
the healthful quality of the bread made by the workman.”).  
 174. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 305 (“In retrospect, neither 
Lochner-style economic due process nor Carolene Products’ extreme deference 
was a good vehicle for ferreting out the harmful effects of special interest control 
of legislation.”).  
 175. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63–64 (noting several state supreme courts 
that upheld the right of freedom to contract over legislative attempts to regulate 
various professions through licensing or certification). 
 176. See id. at 53 (explaining that legislative interference with the freedom 
to contract is constitutional, provided that the law is a legitimate exercise of 
police power because it relates to “safety, health, morals and general welfare of 
the public”). 
 177. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(explaining that the presumption of constitutionality may be challenged when 
legislation appears “on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the 
Constitution”). 
 178. See id. at 145 (describing the Filled Milk Act). 
 179. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. 
CT. REV. 397, 402. 
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“Milnut.”180 It is produced to this day by Smucker’s, Inc., but 
renamed “Milnot” a year after the decision.181 Far from being 
progressive regulation in the public interest, Carolene Products 
actually represented an instance of special interest capture by the 
dairy industry, attempting to protect itself from an inexpensive 
alternative.182 Just prior to the Supreme Court decision, several 
state courts had struck down similar state law provisions because 
they had not been shown to relate reasonably to health, safety, or 
morals.183 
B. The Neoclassical Market: The Commerce Clause and Interstate 
Production 
Gilded Age and early twentieth century markets were larger 
than they had been previously, and in two different senses. The 
first was technological, resulting from the revolution in 
transportation and manufacturing.184 The railroad greatly 
decreased the cost and increased the speed of interstate 
shipments, and mass production required firms to seek out wider 
markets for their goods.185 
                                                                                                     
 180. See Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 146. 
 181. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 306 (explaining that 
“Milnot” is for sale today and owned by Smucker’s); Miller, supra note 179, at 
399 (similar). 
 182. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 305–06 (explaining that 
Carolene Products “undermined the Supreme Court’s ability to limit ‘capture’ by 
special interest groups”); Miller, supra note 179, at 398–99 (explaining that the 
statute at issue was an extreme example of special interest legislation). 
 183. See, e.g., Carolene Prods. Co. v. McLaughlin, 5 N.E.2d 447, 449–50 (Ill. 
1936) (concluding that the act in question was not enacted based on concern for 
the public health); Carolene Prods. Co. v. Thomson, 267 N.W. 608, 611 (Mich. 
1935) (concluding that prohibiting manufacture of filled milk, which is 
“harmless to public health,” cannot be justified under the police power); 
Carolene Prods. Co. v. Banning, 268 N.W. 313, 315 (Neb. 1936) (concluding that 
a state statute banning filled milk is unrelated to “health, safety, morals or 
general welfare”).  
 184. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 189 (noting that the 
technological revolution in the late 1800s was due to “railroad expansion, 
electricity, the internal combustion engine, and machine production”).  
 185. See id. at 295–96. 
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Second was the changing economic conception of the market. 
Historically the “market” had been viewed as a setting where 
buyers and sellers make exchanges, a metaphor that was both 
personal and local.186 For neoclassical economists such as Alfred 
Marshall, however, the market was an area over which prices 
moved toward equilibrium.187 The market became depicted by 
demand and supply curves that did not distinguish individual 
production activities.188 Acquisition of raw materials, processing, 
distribution, and delivery all became part of an undifferentiated 
production function.189 Further, a bottleneck at any stage could 
affect all other stages. Recognition of this principle made the 
manufacturing–commerce distinction untenable for situations 
where a significant portion of a production-distribution chain was 
interstate.190 
Increasingly after the Civil War, important production 
decisions were made in contemplation of interstate transactions, 
mainly by rail.191 A New York producer of beet sugar might grow 
and pack it for shipment to Boston or New York. A farmer’s 
decision about what to plant and how much to grow depended 
critically on his anticipation about the size of the market.192 
These queries collapsed decisions about production and shipment 
into one.193 They obliterated any usefulness that the distinction 
                                                                                                     
 186. See id. at 295 (stating that economists no longer viewed the market as 
“a place where traders meet to exchange goods and haggle over prices”).  
 187. See id. (explaining Marshall viewed markets a “geographic area over 
which prices tend to move toward an equilibrium”).  
 188. See Lawrence A. Boland, Difficulties with the Element of Time and the 
‘Principles’ of Economics or Some Lies My Teachers Told Me, 8 E. ECON. J. 47, 52 
(1982) (noting that one problem with Marshall’s definition is the assumption 
that all quantities are fixed—except price).  
 189. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 295.  
 190. See id. at 296–97 (discussing the impact of wider manufacturing on the 
manufacturing–commerce distinction).  
 191. See id. at 295.  
 192. See id.  
 193. See id. (“Neoclassical economics collapsed questions about how much to 
grow, how much to manufacture, and how much to ship into a single one defined 
by the anticipated size of the market.”).  
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between “manufacturing” and “commerce” under dual federalism 
might ever have had.194 
In 1895, the Supreme Court ruled 8–1 that manufacturing is 
not commerce.195 As a result, the Sherman Act could not reach a 
trust of sugar manufacturers located in a single state even if the 
shipments were designated at production for interstate 
shipment.196 The acknowledged object of the trust, as Justice 
Harlan observed in his dissent, was “to obtain a [great] influence 
or more perfect control over the business of refining and selling 
sugar in this country.”197 To the extent the trust exported its 
product, the state where the production plants were located was 
the beneficiary rather than the victim of its monopoly.198 As a 
result, Chief Justice Fuller and the majority stated the concern 
backwards when they opined that the “relief of the citizens of 
each state from the burden of monopoly and the evils resulting 
from the restraint of trade among such citizens was left with the 
states to deal with.”199 Insofar as this was a monopoly issue, the 
state’s interest was aligned with the sellers’ rather than the 
buyers’. The victims were elsewhere. 
In 1918, the Supreme Court followed the sugar trust 
reasoning in striking down the first federal child labor law.200 
                                                                                                     
 194. See id. at 295–96.  
 195. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1895) (“Commerce 
succeeds to manufacture, and is not a part of it.”). 
 196. See OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–
1910, at 114 (1993) (explaining how the Court found that sugar refining was 
manufacturing and that “monopolization of that economic activity . . . was a 
proper subject of concern for the states, but not for the federal government”). 
 197. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 18 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also FISS, supra 
note 196, at 114–15 (discussing Harlan’s opinion that the Sugar Trust had 
created a monopoly to control the price of refined sugar in the United States); 
Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure of the Large 
Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 648 (1978) (explaining the 
significance of the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions for companies seeking to 
manufacture on a large scale).  
 198. See E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 17 (explaining that defendants’ actions 
were limited to Pennsylvania and initial sales were made in Philadelphia and 
Pennsylvania). 
 199. Id. at 11. 
 200. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918). 
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Now the margin was 5–4, however.201 The statute prohibited the 
use of child labor to produce goods that were shipped interstate 
within thirty days of their manufacture.202 The thirty-day 
limitation is telling because it indicates that interstate shipment 
for the goods in question was planned.203 They were being 
manufactured in fulfillment of orders from out of state. 
Justice Holmes’s dissent made two eminently sensible points. 
The first was that Congress was in fact regulating what could be 
transported across a state line.204 It was not regulating child 
labor for purely intrastate production and sale.205 His other point 
was this: 
The Act does not meddle with anything belonging to the 
States. They may regulate their internal affairs and their 
domestic commerce as they like. But when they seek to send 
their products across the State line they are no longer within 
their rights. If there were no Constitution and no Congress 
their power to cross the line would depend upon their 
neighbors. Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not 
to the States but to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its 
views of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have 
upon the activities of the States. Instead of being encountered 
by a prohibitive tariff at her boundaries the State encounters 
the public policy of the United States which it is for Congress 
to express.206 
The sugar trust and child labor decisions raised important 
issues about market size and regulatory sovereigns. By the time 
Hammer v. Dagenhart207 was decided, many states had enacted 
child labor laws, and the Supreme Court had already held that a 
                                                                                                     
 201. See id. at 281. 
 202. See id. at 277 (“The single question in this case is whether Congress 
has power to prohibit the shipment in interstate or foreign commerce of any 
product . . . in which within thirty days before the removal of the product 
children . . . have been employed.”).  
 203. See id. at 268 (noting that the Act was “intended to prevent interstate 
commerce in the products of child labor”). 
 204. See id. at 277. 
 205. See id. at 277–78 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The statute confines itself to 
prohibiting the carriage of certain goods in interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
 206. Id. at 281. 
 207. 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
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state child labor provision did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.208 But while states limited the use of child labor within 
their own borders, they did not limit the importation of goods 
from other states that employed child labor.209 Thomas Reed 
Powell and Edward Corwin independently complained that in a 
market dominated by interstate shipment and individual state 
child labor laws, there would be a race to the bottom to the extent 
that manufacturers could employ child labor freely for interstate 
shipments.210 
Both United States v. E.C. Knight Co.211 and Hammer 
illustrated what came to be a central proposition of neoclassical 
theory: regulators who are smaller than the markets that they 
are regulating produce self-dealing. States would benefit by 
limiting monopolies for domestic consumption, but by 
encouraging them for exported goods, which produced high 
domestic returns and visited their harm elsewhere. The much 
later decision in Parker v. Brown212 illustrated the problem. The 
Supreme Court upheld a state-administered raisin allocation 
program, a leftover of the first New Deal, which effectively 
cartelized raisin production in California.213 Ninety-five percent 
                                                                                                     
 208. See Sturges & Burn Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 325 (1913) 
(“It is . . . contended that the statute denied to the plaintiff in error the equal 
protection of the laws; but the classification it established was clearly within the 
legislative power.”). 
 209. See id. at 271–72 (“The act in its effect does not regulate transportation 
among the States, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be 
employed in mining and manufacturing within the States.”). 
 210. See Edward S. Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce a 
Crucial Constitutional Issue, 18 CORNELL L. REV. 477, 487 (1933) 
(“If . . . programs of social reform . . . are rendered abortive in any state in 
consequence of the flow of commerce into it from other states holding less 
advanced views, then it becomes the duty . . . to supply the required relief.”); 
Thomas Reed Powell, Child Labor, Congress and the Constitution, 1 N.C. L. 
REV. 61, 67 (1922) (“Thus the beneficent operation of the commerce clause 
includes a license to what humanitarians unkindly call the ‘backward states’ to 
sacrifice the health and strength of future citizens and soldiers of the nation to 
the domestication of gainful industry within their borders.”). 
 211. 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
 212. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
 213. See id. at 350–68 (upholding the validity of the California Agricultural 
Prorate Act); VICTORIA SAKER WOESTE, THE FARMER’S BENEVOLENT TRUST: LAW 
AND AGRICULTURAL COOPERATION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA 1865–1945, at 229–31 
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of the raisins grown under the arrangement were shipped outside 
of the state, making California an enormous beneficiary of the 
cartel and the other states its victims.214 Neoclassical conceptions 
of market failure and market size necessitated the conclusion 
that efficient regulatory sovereigns must be large enough to 
encompass the markets that they are regulating—a point that 
Holmes realized full well in his Hammer dissent.215 
The final Supreme Court decision relying on the 
manufacturing–commerce distinction was Carter, which 
overturned a federal statute that regulated working conditions 
and production standards in the bituminous coal industry.216 A 
few years later, the Supreme Court reversed course in United 
States v. Darby,217 which overruled Hammer and upheld the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, forbidding the interstate shipment of goods 
in violation of its wage and hours provisions.218 Wickard v. 
Filburn219 a year later created modern “affecting commerce” 
jurisdiction.220 
When it later applied Wickard to the Sherman Act, the 
Supreme Court reflected a thoroughly neoclassical view of 
markets, merging production and distribution into a single 
function. The Court condemned an intrastate cartel among 
stitching contractors for women’s clothing.221 The stitching cartel 
                                                                                                     
(1998) (describing the effect of Parker on the California raisin industry). 
 214. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 345 (“Between 90 and 95 percent of the raisins 
grown in California are ultimately shipped in interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
 215. See Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251, 281 (1918) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (discussing the ability of Congress to regulate commerce versus the 
ability of the states). 
 216. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936) (“[T]he want of 
power on the part of the federal government is the same whether the wages, 
hours of service, and working conditions, and the bargaining about them, are 
related to production before interstate commerce has begun, or to sale and 
distribution after it has ended.”). 
 217. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
 218. See id. at 115–16, 124 (“[T]he power of Congress under the Commerce 
Clause is plenary to exclude any article from interstate commerce subject only 
to the specific prohibitions of the Constitution.”). 
 219. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 220. See id. at 124 (stating that the commerce power extends to activities 
intrastate that substantially affect interstate commerce). 
 221. See United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 463 
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was located in Boston, but its members purchased cloth from 
outside the state and also sold locally to distributors who then 
shipped more than eighty percent of their product into other 
states.222 The Court brushed aside the defense that the price fix 
was for stitching, all of which occurred within a single state: 
The trial court appears to have dismissed the case chiefly on 
the ground that the accused Association and its members were 
not themselves engaged in interstate commerce. This may or 
may not be the nature of their operation considered alone, but 
it does not matter. Restraints, to be effective, do not have to be 
applied all along the line of movement of interstate commerce. 
The source of the restraint may be intrastate, as the making of 
a contract or combination usually is; the application of the 
restraint may be intrastate, as it often is; but neither matters 
if the necessary effect is to stifle or restrain commerce among 
the states. If it is interstate commerce that feels the pinch, it 
does not matter how local the operation which applies the 
squeeze.223 
The Court was stating what came to be a bedrock principle of 
the theory of vertical integration and price, embraced by every 
ideology: a monopoly or cartel at any stage of a production chain 
is able to capture the full monopoly profit available for that 
product, even if prior and subsequent stages are competitive.224 A 
cartel on purely intrastate stitching could have exactly the same 
price effect on the final product as a cartel governing interstate 
clothing production or, for that matter, even interstate railroad 
transportation. 
 
                                                                                                     
(1949) (“That such a contract restrains trade in violation of the Sherman Act is 
obvious . . . .”). 
 222. Id. at 461–62. 
 223. Id. at 464. 
 224. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372–75, 380–81 
(1978) (discussing how tying arrangements can permit a monopolist to maximize 
his gains); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE § 10.6a (5th ed. 2015) (forthcoming); RICHARD A. 
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 197–99 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the effects of tying 
arrangements); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Trying Arrangements and the Leverage 
Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19, 20–23 (1957) (similar). 
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C. Holmes’s Marginalism: Deterrence and Risk Management 
One noteworthy problem with the classical–progressive 
dichotomy theory is the omnipresence of Holmes, whose career 
stretched over a relatively brief Harvard faculty post, twenty 
years as a state Justice on the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, and then thirty years on the United States 
Supreme Court. On both federal and state law issues, he often 
appeared to take the progressive side, leading some writers to 
misinterpret his personal views quite seriously.225 For example, 
he dissented from the Lochner decision striking down a ten-hour 
law,226 the Hammer decision striking down a federal child labor 
statute,227 and the Adkins v. Children’s Hospital228 decision 
striking down a minimum wage statute for women workers.229 
Nonetheless, while Holmes was clearly not classical, neither 
was he progressive. He was conservative by nature and very 
suspicious of economic tinkering by legislation.230 At the same 
time, he shared many progressive views about race and 
genetics.231 Holmes may or may not have been sincere in Lochner, 
when he said he would need long study before determining his 
position on the economic theory underlying labor protection 
statutes.232 But just as certainly as Holmes was not a progressive, 
he was an economic marginalist, and this made all the difference. 
                                                                                                     
 225. See, e.g., CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, YANKEE FROM OLYMPUS: JUSTICE 
HOLMES AND HIS FAMILY 366–99 (1944) (emphasizing Holmes’s dissents); Walton 
H. Hamilton, On Dating Mr. Justice Holmes, 9 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 1, 19 (1941) 
(“If the net result seemed to be liberalism, it was because his stay on the bench 
coincided with an era of reform.”). 
 226. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 227. Hammer v. Dagenhart 247 U.S. 251, 277–81 (1918) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). 
 228. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
 229. Id. at 567–71 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
   230.    Irving Bernstein, The Conservative Mr. Justice Holmes, 23 NEW ENG. Q. 
435, 435 (1950) (“Holmes, in fact, was as profound, as civilized, and as articulate 
a conservative as the United States has produced.”) 
 231. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 38–42, 67 (discussing 
Holmes’s views on Darwinism and the “science” of race). 
 232. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text (discussing Holmes’s 
Lochner dissent). 
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Scholarship about Holmes has tended to emphasize the role 
of Darwinian evolution in his thought, particularly its 
evolutionary historicism.233 Holmes’s interest in evolution is 
clear. For example, The Common Law cites the British Darwinian 
anthropologist Edward Tylor several times for points about the 
cultural evolution of legal norms.234 
While these influences are undeniable, it is equally clear that 
Holmes’s approach to legal policy was utilitarian and marginalist, 
driven by concerns about deterrence and risk management.235 A 
theme that dominates The Common Law is the appropriate legal 
standards for managing risk and minimizing expected losses. 
“[T]he safest way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person 
who decides what precautions shall be taken,” stated his chapter on 
trespass and negligence, giving several examples.236 The legal risk 
must be borne by the one with superior control of the 
circumstances, he wrote in his introductory chapter on torts, 
speaking of the person who rides an unbroken horse on a crowded 
way.237 He defended aggressive rules for highly dangerous conduct 
that “throw the risk upon the party pursuing it.”238 He famously 
argued that contracts involved “the taking of a risk” and a set of 
                                                                                                     
 233. See, e.g., 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: 
THE PROVING YEARS, 1870–1882, at 44–49 (1963) (arguing Holmes’s acceptance 
of Darwin); LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 49–69 (2001) (describing 
Holmes’s scholarship as an evolution); DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: 
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views); G. EDWARD WHITE, JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: LAW AND THE 
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and evolutionary historicism); E. Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal 
Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 113, 126–40 (1984) 
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The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 343, 363 
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Common Law). 
 234. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 11, 19, 34 (1881) (citing 
EDWARD TYLOR, PRIMITIVE CULTURE: RESEARCHES INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
MYTHOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION, ART, AND CUSTOM (1871)). 
 235. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 38–42 (discussing Holmes’s 
marginalism). 
 236. HOLMES, supra note 234, at 117. 
 237. Id. at 157–58. 
 238. Id. at 149. 
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bets about the future.239 Consequential damages were not 
appropriate “unless the assumption of that risk is to be taken as 
having fairly entered into the contract.”240 
Holmes’s belief that we can never examine the internal 
workings of the minds of others became a staple of legal thought in 
the early twentieth century. His external standard began with the 
hypothesis of the “average man,” considering “what would be 
blameworthy in the . . . man of ordinary intelligence and 
prudence.”241 
Whether or not Holmes appreciated it, the substitution of the 
hypothetical average person for inquiries about subjective state of 
mind turned the law into a social control device for managing risk. 
The average person did not really exist; he had to be reconstructed. 
Harvard Law Professor and Holmes disciple Warren A. Seavey 
wrote later of Holmes’s insights that “[t]he standard man evaluates 
interests in accordance with the valuation placed upon them by the 
community sentiment crystallized into law.”242 
Holmes’s famous, widely reprinted commencement speech 
entitled The Path of the Law (1897) was even clearer that the whole 
point of law was marginal deterrence and that economics was 
essential to its study.243 For example, the purpose of damages was 
to give people a motive for good behavior. Holmes made this 
powerful argument for marginal deterrence as the goal of criminal 
punishment, categorically rejecting more Darwinian approaches: 
If the typical criminal is a degenerate, bound to swindle or to 
murder by as deep seated an organic necessity as that which 
makes the rattlesnake bite, it is idle to talk of deterring him 
by the classical method of imprisonment. He must be got rid 
of; he cannot be improved, or frightened out of his structural 
reaction. If, on the other hand, crime, like normal human 
conduct, is mainly a matter of imitation, punishment fairly 
                                                                                                     
 239. Id. at 300–02. 
 240. Id. at 301. 
 241. Id. at 108. 
 242. Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective, 41 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 10, 27 (1927); see also Warren A. Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 
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 243. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 
(1897). 
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may be expected to help to keep it out of fashion. The study of 
criminals has been thought by some well known men of science 
to sustain the former hypothesis . . . . But there is weighty 
authority for the belief that, however this may be, “not the 
nature of the crime, but the dangerousness of the criminal, 
constitutes the only reasonable legal criterion to guide the 
inevitable social reaction against the criminal.”244 
No single individual did more than Holmes to reorient 
American legal thinking in the late nineteenth century, switching 
its emphasis from morality and redress for the past to a concern 
with appropriate incentives and management of risk. But these 
were hardly exclusively progressive concerns. To the contrary, 
they cut across all of elite legal thought, from commercial law and 
contracts to corporate law to tort theory. 
D. Corporate Finance, Structure, and Governance 
Another area that was powerfully affected by the marginalist 
revolution was the legal theory of the corporation, particularly 
corporate finance. Ideology is powerful, however, and what makes 
corporate law so interesting is the way that the doctrine “flipped.” 
In this case, the progressives clung to traditional, classical 
theories of value, while more conservative corporate scholars 
turned to forward-looking reasonable expectations theories.  
Under classical corporate finance theory, the legal value of a 
firm was a function of its paid-in capital, which was the amount 
of cash or other property that had been placed into the 
corporation at the time of its formation, plus subsequent 
contributions.245 Corporate shares were issued at “par,” which 
was predicated on this stated value.246 For example, if a firm had 
$1,000 of paid-in capital, it could issue 100 shares of stock with a 
stated par value of $10 per share, typically printed on each stock 
certificate. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, this 
                                                                                                     
 244. Id. at 458, 461, 471, 473–74. 
 245. See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 160 (“The value of a 
corporation was its paid-in capital, a backward-looking amount declared by the 
stated ‘par’ value of shares.”). 
 246. Id. at 160. 
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classical view in 1889, the stock certificate “stands in the hands 
of the subscriber for so much as, and no more than, the amount 
actually paid upon it.”247 
Stock was said to be “watered” when the stated par value, or 
par multiplied by the number of shares, was greater than the 
actual paid-in capital.248 This could occur because stated capital 
had simply not been paid in or—more commonly—because 
noncash assets had been contributed at exaggerated evaluations. 
For example, a 1907 decision by the Illinois Supreme Court held 
that a penniless promoter’s unwritten play and unpatented 
inventions were not worth the $2 million that the promoter 
declared but were “wholly unpaid.”249 A great deal of Gilded Age 
and Progressive Era literature as well as many court decisions 
were concerned with claims of stock “watering.”250 The watering 
metaphor was a reference to ranchers who sometimes forced 
cattle to drink large amounts of water in order to inflate their 
weight before auction.251 Beginning during Reconstruction and 
stretching through the Gilded Age, progressive writers such as 
Charles Francis Adams, persistently identified and attacked 
corporate abuses that took the form of stock watering.252 
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To marginalist eyes, the classical theory of corporate finance 
made little sense and certainly did not reflect how investors 
assessed value. A corporation’s value might be close to its paid-in 
capital on the day it commenced business, but soon after, it could 
be worth either much more or much less, depending on how it 
fared in business. In sharp contrast to the classical theory, 
marginalists argued that the value of a corporation is a set of 
judgments about its reasonable prospects in the market. As a 
result the concept of “par” as historical paid-in capital became 
meaningless. Around 1910, states began to approve the issuance 
of “no-par” shares.253 
One interesting thing about the marginalist thinking that 
swept classical finance theory under the rug is that it came from 
the political right—not from progressives, but largely from 
financial interests generally aligned with large business. The 
principal instigator of the new valuation methodologies was the 
New York Bar, which by the Gilded Age was becoming the hub of 
United States corporate finance.254 By contrast, the marginal 
contribution theory of wages, discussed below, that undermined 
the wage-fund doctrine came mainly from progressive or more left 
leaning economists or lawyers who saw in it a rationale for either 
unionization or minimum wage laws. These same progressives 
resisted marginal value theories of corporate finance. Rather, 
they clung to classical value theories, which enabled them to 
develop their arguments against watered stock. 
Although the new theory of corporate finance was far more 
realistic about the determinants of corporate value, it was also 
                                                                                                     
 253. See James Bonbright, No-Par Stock: Its Economics and Legal Aspect, 38 
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more difficult for the law to control. Under the classical theory, 
corporate finance could be managed by any commercially literate 
judge. Whether capital had been paid in was largely a matter of 
accounting. The most difficult questions concerned valuation of 
paid-in noncash assets, but most judges had experience doing this 
as well. By contrast, the rational expectations theory required 
predictions about future performance, and the relevant variables 
included the market as well as the particular firm. As a result, 
along with the change from backward-looking to forward-looking 
theories of corporate finance came increased calls for regulatory 
control, first in the form of state “Blue Sky” laws255 and later 
through federal securities regulation.256 The perceived need for 
regulation of corporate financial disclosure actually emanated 
from developments that occurred within the corporate bar as 
much as progressive reformers. 
These same forward-looking rational expectations models 
also led to changing ideas about the relationship between 
corporate management and shareholders. Once again, the idea 
came from two different ideological directions. On the left, 
progressives Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means wrote The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, a book that today is 
identified with the theory that the modern large corporation is 
characterized by separation of stock ownership and managerial 
control.257 Berle and Means saw this separation as the source of 
improper corporate power and waste. 
But economists who stood much more centrally in the 
neoclassical tradition also embraced separation of ownership and 
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control.258 The neoclassical theory of corporate finance and 
management predicated the firm as a single, rational economic 
actor intent on maximizing its value. Neoclassical economic 
scholarship treated the corporation as a unitary maximizing 
entity. The possibly separate wishes of shareholders were either 
disparaged or ignored. This line of thought began with Yale 
economist Irving Fisher’s “separation theorem,” first articulated 
early in the twentieth century, that the profit function of a 
corporation could not be derived from the individual utility 
functions of its shareholders.259 In the late 1930s, Ronald Coase’s 
Nature of the Firm, written before Coase moved to the United 
States, developed a complete theory of firm structure from which 
the shareholder was entirely absent.260 Coase argued that a firm’s 
managers decide whether to make something internally or 
procure it from inside by comparing the costs of internal 
production against the costs of using the market.261 The 
aggregate of these decisions determines the firm’s boundaries. 
Coase’s article never mentioned shareholders, who were 
irrelevant to the maximizing, explicitly marginalist decisions that 
Coase contemplated.262 
The final elimination of the shareholder as an important 
element in corporate finance and management came in the 1950s 
and after, first with the development of the Modigliani-Miller 
Theorem, for which its authors Franco Modigliani of MIT and 
Merton Miller at the University of Chicago won the Nobel 
prize.263 The theorem states that in a perfectly functioning 
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market for corporate finance the value of the firm is invariant to 
its ratio of equity to debt.264 The implication was that stock 
“ownership” was really nothing more than an alternative way of 
supplying capital to the corporation. 
The nineteenth century idea of the shareholder as actively 
involved in corporate decision making had lost its vitality except 
as to very large shareholders. The development of the Efficient 
Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) in subsequent years further 
diminished the role of the shareholder as active and interested 
investor. Under rational expectations theory, random choice 
works just as well as extensive research, for the result of the 
research would be reflected in the stock price already.265 The 
extreme result today is the index fund, in which the average 
shareholder knows almost nothing about the corporations whose 
shares he owns—cannot name their CEOs or perhaps even 
identify the products that they manufacture.266 This neoclassical 
vision of separation of ownership and control was far more 
extreme than anything that Berle and Means had ever 
contemplated. It was also just as clearly not a part of classical 
legal thought. 
 
 
                                                                                                     
xiii (Andrew Abel ed., 1980); see also Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The 
Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 AM. 
ECON. REV. 261, 264, 295–96 (1958) (providing the theorem that suggests that 
there is a remarkably small difference between the cost of equity funds and debt 
funds); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, Dividend Policy, Growth, and the 
Valuation of Shares, 34 J. BUS. 411, 411–15 (1961) (examining the effect of 
dividend policy on a firm’s share price). 
 264. See MODIGLIANI, supra note 140, at xiii (“[T]he market value of the 
firm—debt plus equity—depends only on the income stream generated by its 
assets.”). 
 265. See Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J. BUS. 
34, 39 (1965) (“[I]f there are many astute traders in the market, on the average 
the full effects of new information on intrinsic values will be reflected nearly 
instantaneously in actual prices.”). On the history, see MICHAEL C. JENSEN & 
CLIFFORD W. SMITH, JR., THE MODERN THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 2–20 
(1984); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 388 (1970). Fama won the Nobel Prize in 2013. 
 266. HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 6, at 183. 
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E. The Labor Problem 
In labor law, by contrast to corporate finance, progressive 
reformers took up the marginalist position, while traditionalists 
clung to classical views. The classical theory of wages was 
expressed in the “wage-fund doctrine,” developed most 
extensively in the work of David Ricardo and culminating in the 
writing of John Stuart Mill until he abruptly rejected it late in 
life.267 Under the wage-fund theory the rate of wages was thought 
to be a function of the surplus remaining from production and 
sale during the previous business period. During each business 
cycle, a firm produced, sold, and paid wages and return on 
capital. The surplus that remained after these payments were 
made was a “fund” that could be used to pay wages during the 
subsequent period.268 This surplus had to be divided among the 
workers and thus determined both the number that could be 
hired and the rate they could be paid.269 A firm could pay more 
only by exhausting the surplus and borrowing against the future. 
This would produce business distress, failure, and unemployment 
and starvation for the workers. As a result, everyone, including 
the workers themselves, had an interest in ensuring that the 
aggregate amount of wages paid in a second period did not exceed 
the surplus left over from the previous period. 
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fund and the number of the labouring population. If this proportion remains 
unchanged, the average rate of wages cannot be raised.”). 
 268. See ANTONELLA STIRATI, THE THEORY OF WAGES IN CLASSICAL 
ECONOMICS: A STUDY OF ADAM SMITH, DAVID RICARDO, AND THEIR 
CONTEMPORARIES 177–79 (Joan Hall trans., 1994) (detailing the development of 
wage-fund theory). 
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American political economists in the classical tradition 
generally supported the wage-fund theory.270 Arthur Latham 
Perry, an American economist at Williams College, explained the 
theory in the mid-nineteenth century, calling attention to its anti-
statist and anti-union implications: 
That which pays for labor in every country, is a certain portion 
of actually accumulated capital, which cannot be increased by 
the proposed action of government, nor by the influence of 
public opinion, nor by combinations among the workmen 
themselves. There is also in every country a certain number of 
laborers, and this number cannot be diminished by the 
proposed action of government, nor by public opinion, nor by 
combinations among themselves. There is to be a division now 
among all these laborers of the portion of capital actually there 
present.271 
Perry’s vision of the “iron law of wages,” as it was sometimes 
called, confirmed that both government minimum wage laws and 
union activity would be useless and affirmatively harmful. 
Neither could raise wages beyond the amount that the fund made 
available. If they attempted to do so, the result would be firm 
bankruptcy and unemployment. 
By the Gilded Age, however, some American political 
economists were seeing important qualifications. The history of 
Brown University President Francis Wayland’s highly influential 
textbook in political economy illustrates the changes. It was 
originally published in 1837 and stated an orthodox version of the 
wage-fund theory, very likely taken from David Ricardo.272 
Wayland’s book went through many editions and was continued 
after his death in 1865 by Aaron L. Chapin, an important 
economist in his own right and also the founding President of 
Beloit College. Chapin acknowledged in his preface to the 1879 
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edition of Wayland’s Political Economy that he had read Jevons, 
the English marginalist.273 He then proceeded to develop an early 
marginal utility theory of wages. The real value of wages, he 
wrote, was anticipated production—“a hopeful opportunity for 
increasing wealth by the profits of production.”274 To that end, the 
employer did not actually draw money out of any previously 
accumulated fund. “More likely what is needed for wages will be 
borrowed from the bank, in anticipation of coming sales.”275 In his 
1881 lectures on political economy, prepared for his classes at 
Johns Hopkins and Michigan, Henry Carter Adams took the 
same position,276 as did Francis Amasa Walker of MIT.277 
Some American traditionalists such as Yale’s William 
Graham Sumner defended the wage-fund theory right through 
the Gilded Age by mocking emergent marginalism’s expected 
value theories. The marginal productivity theory of wages, he 
scoffed, imagined “that a man who was tilling the ground in June 
could eat the crop he expected to have in September, or that a tailor 
could be wearing the coat which he was making.”278 
Of course, Sumner was missing the point. The fact that the 
rate of wages depends on expected marginal contribution of the 
laborer did not mean that the contribution must already be in the 
bank before a salary check could be written. It was not the 
existence of the money but the rational expectation that it would 
come that drove the marginal contribution theory of wages. 
Sumner’s objection only served to illustrate classical political 
economy’s inability to see value as capitalization of future 
expectations. 
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By the turn of the century, marginalist economists were 
uniformly seeing wages as determined by rational expectations 
concerning employee contribution. John Bates Clark wrote a 
highly generalized argument that in a competitive market, the 
value of every factor of production, including labor, would be its 
marginal productivity.279 For each worker, wages were limited by 
that worker’s marginal contribution to the employer. If a worker’s 
labor promised to increase firm value by twenty-five cents per 
hour, then the employer would pay any wage up to that amount. 
If it paid less, it could retain the excess as a surplus, but it would 
stop hiring rather than pay more. 
This “marginal productivity” theory of wages completely 
upended the classical wage-fund theory, and many young 
marginalist economists in the United States cut their teeth 
developing its various implications, including criticism of 
Supreme Court decisions that struck down minimum wage 
laws.280 For example, George G. Groat, an economist from the 
University of Vermont, attacked the Supreme Court’s 1923 
Adkins decision in the Yale Law Journal. He contrasted the 
“legal wage” theory, which he identified with the wages fund and 
economic substantive due process, with the “economic wage,” 
which he identified with the marginal utility theory.281 Under 
that theory “marginal men get what they produce.”282 
The wage-fund theory very likely explained both the Lochner 
era judicial hostility toward statutory wage and hours regulation, 
but also the commonly recognized exception for public 
employees.283 Public employers did not pay wages out of 
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accumulated earnings but rather out of government 
appropriations, financed by tax dollars rather than earnings. As a 
result the wage-fund doctrine did not apply to them. 
As Groat’s essay reflected, for more progressive leaning 
marginalists an important corollary of the new marginal 
productivity theory was that labor, particularly unskilled labor, 
was not getting its fair share of production. Under perfect 
competition every factor of production, including labor, would 
earn its “marginal net product.” But that was where the rub came 
in. A broad consensus believed that most employer markets were 
much less competitive than most labor markets. As a result, 
wages tend to be lower than marginal productivity and often were 
driven to subsistence levels. These effects were most severe 
among labor unions that served unskilled workers, who were both 
plentiful and mobile. They were less severe in more specialized 
trades.284 
Not everyone shared these policy views, however. Some 
believed that both production and labor were competitive, and 
wages should be wherever free market bargaining placed them.285 
Further, the free flow of labor would incline it to move to its 
highest value level. But the important point is that the battle line 
was drawn in a very different place than the classical–
progressive dichotomy would suggest. Even among those who 
opposed minimum wage law and unions, the wage-fund doctrine 
had no place. 
F. Social Policy and the Distribution of Wealth 
Between roughly 1880 and 1940, marginalist social (welfare) 
economics moved from the political left to the right. The early 
marginalists believed that interpersonal comparisons of utility 
were possible. Because wealth has declining marginal utility, 
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total welfare would be greater as wealth was more evenly 
distributed. Redistribution entailed that wealthier persons, who 
valued the marginal dollar by less because they already had so 
many, would give up much less in welfare than the poor 
recipients, for whom each dollar provided much more utility. 
These ideas were accepted, although sometimes qualified, by 
British marginalists William Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall,286 
and Arthur Cecil Pigou.287 They were also embraced by 
mainstream American economists, including Frank Taussig 
(Harvard), John Bates Clark (Columbia), Simon Patten (Penn, 
Wharton Business School), Jacob Viner (Chicago), Irving Fisher 
(Yale), and Edwin R.A. Seligman (Columbia).288 They obtained 
more limited traction in legal policy making, but are strongly 
reflected in the debates leading to the modern progressive income 
tax.289 
For most mainstream neoclassicists, the “ordinalist 
revolution” of the mid-thirties changed these views rather 
decisively. British economists Lionel Robbins and later John 
Hicks argued that interpersonal comparison of utilities was a 
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scientific impossibility. Doing them required cardinal assessment 
of states of mind, which are fundamentally noncomparable. As a 
result, any statement about the welfare effects of an involuntary 
wealth transfer was purely “normative,” not scientific.290 From 
that point on, neoclassical welfare economics developed its ideas 
of efficiency mainly from Pareto, which eliminated the need for 
interpersonal utility comparisons. In the process, however, the 
new welfare economics very largely removed questions about the 
distribution of wealth from economic science.291 
While the ordinalist revolution deeply affected mainstream 
economics, it never produced complete consensus. More left-
leaning economists in particular have resisted the implication 
that questions about the distribution of wealth are purely 
normative, particularly as they relate to productivity rather than 
consumption.292 In addition, American institutionalist economists 
largely ignored the ordinalist revolution. By the mid-1930s when 
Robbins wrote, institutionalism was being expelled from 
mainstream economics. Its mantle was picked up by the Legal 
Realists, however, who effectively became the “legal division” of 
institutionalism. The result was a sharp division between legal 
policy and neoclassical welfare economics that dominated 
government welfare policy through the 1970s.293 
Today, the economic battle over the role of the state in 
wealth distribution has very little to do with the division between 
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classical and progressive legal thought and not much to do with 
Social Darwinism either. Rather, within economic and policy 
circles, it divides economists who are all marginalist but who 
nevertheless have very different views about the relationship of 
incentive, public support, wealth distribution, consumption, and 
productivity. 
IV. Conclusion 
With its forward-looking theories of value and rational 
decision making, economic marginalism was a world-changing 
idea. So was Darwin in the biological and social sciences. By the 
1920s these ideas had overrun Western thought, including 
American legal thought. Progressives were an important part of 
those who experienced and embraced these changes, but they 
were only a part. Our legal and policy past was not so much a 
conflict between classical and progressive legal thought, as a 
debate about how to accommodate important changes in scientific 
and economic world view that nearly every educated person 
accepted. Classical legal thought vanished in the process, never 
to return. 
